SUMMARY
In many cases of jihadist radicalisation, the direct environment perceived signs and/or knew about the plans of the individual to join a terrorist group (Gill et al., 2014, p. 429). Yet, it can be assumed that only a small number of these persons reported their observations to the competent authorities. The fear of putting the relationship with the radicalising individual or themselves at risk can lead these persons to keep their observations a secret (Williams et al., 2015). This paper argues that the establishment of local points of contact where trained resources persons operate as so-called gatekeepers (Williams et al., 2015, p. 45) could be a meaningful step towards overcoming the lack of trust in the relevant CVE service providers. The establishment of these points of contact as exemplified by the regional prevention network of the Federal State Democracy Centre Baden-Wuerttemberg advances the crucial transition from prevention work to deradicalisation through the qualification of locally embedded resource persons. The points of contact can implement prevention strategies in the districts which are tailored to local requirements and specificities (White House, 2015). Therefore, local points of contact operate at the intersection of prevention work and the federal deradicalisation unit. The concept of a regional prevention network demonstrates the possibility to establish an early warning system with respect to the radicalisation of youths.