SUMMARY
The purpose of corporate governance is to increase confidence of corporate activities and management policies in line with the interests of shareholders in particular and all stakeholders, in general. Therefore, it is expected that corporate governance mechanisms are able to control opportunistic behavior of managers in order to maximize their wealth and prevent damage to the shareholders. In this regard, shareholders consider conservatism and corporate governance as monitoring tools that restrict earnings management. The aim of this study is to investigate the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the relation between conservatism and earnings management in Tehran Stock Exchange.Test hypotheses have been carried out using multiple regression analysis and estimated generalized least squares method (EGLS), with panel data for the period of 1387 to 1393, based on data gathered from 150 participants. The results showed that as concluded by Watts (2003), conservatism through real-time detection of losses and delay in recognizing economic benefits, reduce management opportunities based on the accrual-based earnings. Furthermore, corporate governance variables according to their supervisory role, increase conservatism and reduce the firm's earnings manipulation.