SUMMARY
Part 1It is generally conceded that the record of post- World War II Western or pro-Western governments in countering insurgency has been marked by a long and sad succession of failures. The French endeavours to overcome insurgent forces in Indo-China and Algeria, those of the British with regard to Cyprus and Aden, the American efforts in Vietnam, the Rhodesian and Portuguese counter-offensives in the Zambezi salient, have all ended in ignominous defeat; either through military inadequacy (as in Indo- China); or, more commonly, through political pressures totally nullifying military success (as was the case in Algeria, Aden, Cyprus, the Portuguese Lusophone provinces in Africa, and Rhodesia). There is, however,one extremely significant illustration of a highly successful COIN (counter-insurgency) campaign which has received comparatively little attention; despite the fact that it has been fought in one of the most strategically crucial areas of the globe. This is the war in the Oman; or, more specifically, the series of wars which marked the years 1957-1959 and 1970-1976. The wars are unique in the annals of post-World War II military history, for reasons which will become apparent in the following article.