Corpo funzionale e corpo senziente. La tesi forte del carattere incarnato della mente in fenomenologia
Abstract
Riassunto: In questo lavoro distinguo tra due versioni della tesi del carattere incarnato della mente: “debole” e “forte”. Secondo la versione debole, il possesso di stati mentali presuppone l’esistenza di un corpo che si muove ed agisce nell’ambiente, ossia un corpo funzionale. Secondo la versione forte, invece, il possesso di stati mentali presuppone l’esistenza di un corpo non solo funzionale ma anche senziente, ossia: il corpo come sede della sensibilità o coscienza fenomenica. Sostengo che alcuni approcci all’interno della “scienza cognitiva incarnata” implicano la forma debole di embodiment: la robotica di Brooks, l’enattivismo sensomotorio di Noë e O’Regan e l’enattivismo radicale di Hutto e Myin. In contrapposizione a queste prospettive, e basandomi sull’analisi fenomenologica della corporeità vivente e vissuta, difendo la forma forte di embodiment, secondo cui la mente si fonda essenzialmente sul corpo funzionale e senziente.
Parole chiave: Fenomenologia; Embodiment; Coscienza fenomenica; Enattivismo; Qualità sensibili
Functional body and sentient body. The strong view on the embodied mind in phenomenology
Abstract: In this paper, I draw a distinction between weak and strong versions of the “embodiment thesis”. The weak version claims that mental states are grounded in a body that moves and acts in the environment, i.e., a functional body. The strong version claims that mental states are grounded in a body that is not only functional but also sentient, i.e., a body that is the locus of sensibility or phenomenal consciousness. I argue that some approaches within the “new embodied cognitive science” – Brooks’ robotics, Noë’s and O’Regan’s sensorimotor enactivism, Hutto’s and Myin’s radical enactivism – imply a weak version of the embodiment thesis. In contrast, by drawing on a phenomenological analysis of living and lived corporeality, I argue for the strong version, which claims that the mind is essentially grounded in the functional and sentient body.
Keywords: Phenomenology; Embodiment; Phenomenal Consciousness; Enactivism; Sensible Qualities
Parole chiave
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.4453/rifp.2022.0004
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